Trump, Greenland, and the Changing Arctic Order

Donald Trump’s fixation on Greenland has been top of the agenda for the previous weeks, but what is it really about? In this episode of What’s New?, host Serafima Andreeva speaks with Professor Andreas Østhagen (Fridtjof Nansen Institute) and Erdem Lamazhapov (Fridtjof Nansen Institute) about what the US push to acquire Greenland reveals about a shifting Arctic order.

They argue that the story is less about rare earths or “Chinese and Russian ships” than about power: spheres of influence, political symbolism, and the erosion of constraints that have long shaped Western strategy. The discussion breaks down what Washington can already do in Greenland, what it cannot legally or politically do, and why talk of coercion carries wider consequences — for NATO’s credibility, for norms around sovereignty, and for how other powers read the rules of the international system.

Chapters

• 0:00 Intro
• 0:30 What Trump wants in Greenland
• 3:31 Legal restrictions to annex Greenland
• 5:26 Critical minerals
• 8:37 Greenland-Denmark relations
• 11:20 Protecting Greenland from .. what?
• 15:36 What can happen now?
• 21:20 Policy Recommendations

Transcript

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
Welcome to What’s New? Today, we’re covering Greenland and Trump in the Arctic. I’m joined by two experts in Arctic geopolitics.

Andreas, you’ve been a guest here before. You’re a Research Director at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, working on Arctic and ocean politics. And Erdem Lamazhapov, you’re a PhD candidate researching China in the Arctic, critical minerals, and Russia, among other topics. It’s great to have both of you.

So let’s start with the big question. When it comes to Trump and Greenland: what does Trump actually want in the Arctic? Is this about building a “Golden Dome”? Is it about minerals? What are his real ambitions here?

Speaker 2 – Andreas Østhagen:
We can only speculate — make qualified guesses. We can read the signals coming out of the White House and try to map them against what’s actually happening in the Arctic.

To me, it’s fairly clear that this is not really about minerals. It’s not about Chinese or Russian ships operating all over Greenland, as Trump has suggested. And it’s not even primarily about securing the North American homeland.

This is about broader great-power ambitions and about Donald Trump’s personal interest in asserting power — possibly even acquiring territory. The arguments about minerals or Russian and Chinese vessels function more as pretexts. If this were really just about security or minerals, there would be far easier ways to address those concerns.

Speaker 3 – Erdem Lamazhapov:
I agree with Andreas. I’d probably place a bit more emphasis on the sphere of influence aspect.

The White House has made it quite clear that it sees the Western Hemisphere as an exclusive U.S. sphere of interest — one where other great powers are not tolerated. In reality, neither Russia nor China has managed to gain a foothold in Greenland.

So this broader narrative about American dominance in its sphere of influence is probably more important than the actual facts on the ground.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
But the United States already gets most of what it wants from Greenland, doesn’t it?

Speaker 2 – Andreas Østhagen:
Yes — perhaps not everything Trump personally wants, but the U.S. already has significant access. They can increase troop presence, expand bases, strengthen security arrangements through NATO or bilaterally with Denmark, and even pursue mineral investments if they choose.

What Erdem points to is important: all great powers have spheres of influence. The U.S. has always been concerned about developments in places like Cuba, Panama, Venezuela — and Greenland. What has changed is the rhetoric and the approach. This breaks with previous administrations’ efforts to exercise power while still upholding international law and the principle of self-determination.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
Let’s talk about legality. If the current administration is genuinely interested in acquiring Greenland — even by military means — what legal restrictions exist within the U.S. system? Could Trump actually do this?

Speaker 2 – Andreas Østhagen:
My understanding is that this would require approval well beyond Trump himself. Any use of military force would need support from the Pentagon, the Defense Department, and the military leadership.

I would hope that those actors would clearly say no — because this would mean attacking an ally. It would severely damage NATO and U.S. security interests.

Such a drastic move would also likely require congressional approval. Trump is powerful, but he is not a dictator. I would expect strong resistance in Congress.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
Turning to minerals: we’ve seen headlines about U.S. investments in Greenlandic critical minerals. Where are these resources actually located, how accessible are they, and what role has China played?

Speaker 3 – Erdem Lamazhapov:
China has tried to invest in several mineral projects in Greenland, but without success.

There are two major rare-earth deposits usually discussed. The first is Kvanefjeld (Kuannersuit), a complex and radioactive deposit that also contains uranium. Mining it would require uranium extraction, which Greenlandic society strongly opposes.

This issue dominated Greenland’s 2021 election, leading to a ban on uranium mining. That decision stopped a project partly owned by the Chinese company Shenghe. The case is now moving through Greenland’s courts.

The second deposit, Kringlerne, is different — less rich in rare earths but high in zirconium. This project is moving forward and is backed by a U.S.-linked company, Critical Metals Corp.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
And this project predates the current political tensions — so Trump’s rhetoric doesn’t actually benefit these companies?

Speaker 3 – Erdem Lamazhapov:
Exactly. This is not new. I don’t see how the current situation improves the economics or feasibility of these projects.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
Public opinion in Greenland has been very clear: people don’t want to be annexed by the U.S. Independence is the long-term goal, but if forced to choose, most prefer Denmark. Yet U.S. rhetoric often highlights tensions between Denmark and Greenland. Are those tensions being exaggerated?

Speaker 2 – Andreas Østhagen:
From an outside perspective, yes — they’re often overstated.

Historically, Denmark has mistreated Greenlandic people, and that legacy matters. But over the past two decades, Greenland has gained extensive self-rule and autonomy. Denmark has also taken steps to acknowledge past injustices.

Security policy is still handled in Copenhagen, and one could argue Denmark hasn’t invested enough in Arctic defense. But the idea that Greenland and Denmark are fundamentally divided is exaggerated — and that narrative is often used to drive a wedge between them.

Most Greenlanders still prefer to remain within the Kingdom of Denmark for now.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
Let’s talk about actual security risks. How real are Russian or Chinese threats to Greenland?

Speaker 3 – Erdem Lamazhapov:
Strategically, Greenland matters mainly because of the GIUK gap. This was monitored successfully throughout the Cold War and still is.

China has not deployed submarines near Greenland. Chinese icebreaker activity peaked around 2018 and has since focused more on Alaska. If anything, U.S. Arctic capacity in Alaska has declined — including the loss of its only NSF research icebreaker.

Speaker 2 – Andreas Østhagen:
The Arctic is huge. Threats are highly regional.

Russia operates primarily in the European Arctic, not around Greenland. The main concern related to Greenland is airborne threats from Russia — something the U.S. already monitors through Thule Space Base.

You could argue for better NORAD investments or surveillance capabilities, but there’s no justification for large troop deployments. Coast Guard and monitoring capacities are sufficient.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
Now I’ll ask you to do what scientists hate: speculate. If the U.S. somehow used force to take Greenland — what happens next? Is NATO finished?

Speaker 2 – Andreas Østhagen:
If force were used, it would likely involve quickly taking control of key institutions in Nuuk.

The immediate consequence wouldn’t be war with Denmark — but trust within NATO would collapse. European states could no longer rely on U.S. security guarantees. NATO might survive institutionally, but it would stop functioning politically.

Europe would likely move toward its own security arrangements, slowly decoupling from the U.S.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
And in a more realistic scenario — diplomatic pressure instead of force?

Speaker 3 – Erdem Lamazhapov:
That would still damage U.S. soft power and set dangerous precedents. It would influence how China approaches Taiwan and how Russia interprets its own room for maneuver.

Speaker 2 – Andreas Østhagen:
Exactly. Even non-military coercion would reshape global norms. The irony is that the international system benefits the U.S. more than anyone — undermining it ultimately harms American interests.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
Final question: one policy recommendation each. You choose who advises whom.

Speaker 3 – Erdem Lamazhapov (to the U.S.):
Don’t do it. Let it be.

Speaker 2 – Andreas Østhagen (to Denmark):
Trump needs a symbolic win. Denmark should offer cooperation — increased Arctic security investments, preferential access for U.S. companies — without sacrificing sovereignty. Give him the appearance of control, not the reality.

Speaker 1 – Serafima Andreeva:
Thank you both — this was incredibly insightful. And thank you to everyone listening.